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to industry?
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After the thalidomide tragedy governments in Europe and North
America established new requirements for drug testing intended
to protect the public from ineffective and unsafe drugs. As no
drugs are entirely safe, regulators must determine whether
manufacturers have provided enough evidence to show that
drugs’ benefits outweigh their harms. Precisely how high the
evidence bar should be set for marketing authorisation has been
hotly disputed ever since the enactment of modern drug
regulation. The industry has long contended that the process is
too complex and expensive, delaying patients’ access to
lifesaving drugs.
Despite three decades of streamlining of regulatory processes
and drug testing,1 the industry, some patients’ advocates,
lobbyists, and investors still argue that the current model of
drug development and regulation is unsustainable. They have
called for a “paradigm shift” to allow greater numbers of new
drugs to be approved on the basis of preliminary data, with key
information about benefits and harms to be collected only after
drugs have come on the market and are being used by patients.2
There may be limited circumstances that justify rapid access to
new drugs on the basis of minimal data, but evidence indicates
that regulators have been too permissive in their interpretation
of existing criteria for expedited approval,3 that current
regulatory standards are already too lax, and that low standards
have failed to incentivise genuine therapeutic innovation.1-6
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has embraced a new
model of drug testing and marketing called “adaptive
pathways”—the brainchild of an industry funded think tank,
NEWDIGS (New Drug Development Paradigms), at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The adaptive pathways
model would skip several steps designed to protect patients
from unsafe and ineffective drugs, allowing new drugs for
“unmet medical needs” to be launched on the market faster, on
the basis of fewer data. The EMA initiated a pilot project to test
the new paradigm and reported final results this month.7 As the
project was concluded before any of the pilot drugs in
development had been granted marketing authorisation, it
remains unclear how the EMA will define “unmet needs,” and
crucial information relating to the design and reliability of
studies to generate evidence of drug safety and efficacy is absent
from the report.8 Nevertheless, the EMA has judged its pilot
project a success and will integrate adaptive pathways into the
existing EU regulatory framework.
The argument that adaptive pathways will benefit patients and
public health is based on several important assumptions. Here
we review those assumptions, finding that the evidence
underpinning them is either lacking or contradictory, calling
into question the EMA’s case.
Paradigm shift?
Though the adaptive pathways model builds on existing
regulatory mechanisms, the EMA’s proposal would extend the
application of current approaches. For example, conditional
marketing authorisation (which allows for approval at an earlier
point in the drug development process) was justified on the
basis that it would be reserved for drugs for seriously debilitating
or life threatening conditions, orphan diseases, or emergency
situations. But it does not seem that such restrictions would
apply in the case of the new model, which envisages “adaptive
licensing” for some drugs that would normally receive
“standard” marketing authorisation.9
Also, the adaptive pathwaysmodel requires companies to collect
and analyse “real world data”—an EMA term for observational
data—to supplement evidence from preliminary clinical studies
and, in some cases, as an alternative to randomised clinical trials
(RCTs). Although effective post-marketing surveillance of drugs
in general use has always been a crucial element in the
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protection of public health, using electronic health records and
patient registries for evidence of drug efficacy is a problem.
Finally, the newmodel requires that companies seeking adaptive
licensing also receive joint scientific advice, in the hope that
early involvement of health technology assessment bodies in
product development discussions would increase the likelihood
that drugs would be reimbursed at the same time they receive
marketing authorisation.
The EMA acknowledges that approval resulting from adaptive
pathways would increase uncertainty about the benefit-harm
balance of new drugs but claims that such uncertainty is ethically
defensible where patients have unmet needs and that the
uncertainty would progressively reduce as additional
“confirmatory” data are collected in the post-marketing period.2
Critics have warned that drugs approved on the basis of limited
evidence may harm patients,10 11 and health advocacy groups
are concerned that adaptive pathways advance a deregulatory
agenda that further erodes standards for the testing and approval
of new drugs.12
“Iterative” drug development
Drugs approved through adaptive pathways would be granted
an initial marketing authorisation earlier in the development
process, on the basis of limited, preliminary data. For example,
companies could test drugs in small, highly selected patient
groups; conduct fewer, shorter term, and smaller clinical studies;
or use surrogate instead of clinically meaningful endpoints. Or
companies might be permitted to bypass phase III testing
altogether and obtain marketing authorisation after completion
of single arm, phase II studies.9 Product development would
continue after new drugs have come on the market and are being
used by patients, with companies seeking to expand from an
initial, narrow indication to an increasingly wider patient
population, or to confirm the benefit-harm balance of a new
drug approved early in development or on the basis of a
surrogate endpoint.7
A key assumption is that marketing approvals that are based on
limited data can give regulators the information they need to
determine whether manufacturers have shown a positive balance
of benefits and harms to patients. But experience and evidence
show that such confidence is misplaced.11 Nearly half of all
investigational drugs that successfully complete phase II studies
fail in phase III, mostly because of lack of safety or efficacy.13 14
This indicates that if new drugs are approved on the basis of
phase II trials there is a 50:50 chance that they are unsafe,
ineffective, or both. Systematic empirical evaluation of the
clinical literature shows that smaller, short term, or single trials
are more likely to overestimate, or to generate spurious,
treatment effects.15 Evaluation of surrogate markers shows that
they are often biased, may overestimate drug benefits,16 and
correlate poorly with outcomes relevant to patients.17 18 There
are several examples of significant harm to patients from
reliance on surrogate endpoints.19 In view of the evidence that
limited data are more likely to lead to false conclusions, it is
difficult to see how the EMA can determine whether early
evidence submitted by manufacturers provides a “sufficient”
basis for judging “likely benefit.”20
A second assumption is that robust clinical studies can, and will,
be conducted rapidly and efficiently once drugs are on the
market, so as to mitigate risks to patients by confirming or
refuting efficacy and safety as quickly as possible. Yet
confirmatory studies are often slow to complete, and drugs with
uncertain benefit-harm profiles may be prescribed to patients
for many years, sometimes even until patent protection expires.3
The EMA claims that, while failures occurred in the past, the
situation has much improved and that a 2011 EMA led study
concluded that “compliance with the CHMP [the criteria of the
EMA’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use] to
conduct studies is generally very good albeit with some aspects
for improvement.”20 However, the most up-to-date evaluations
of the status of conditionally approved drugs in the EU found
that the median time before completion of confirmatory,
post-marketing studies was four years,3 and that half of all
studies were completed only after substantial delays.21
Bedaquiline, approved to treat multidrug resistant tuberculosis,
is a recent example of the risk that long completion times can
pose to public health. The EMA approved it in 2014 on the basis
of a surrogate marker for efficacy, despite trial data indicating
that it increased the risk of death fivefold.22 Instead of deferring
approval until further RCTs could confirm or contradict this
signal of harm to patients, the EMA agreed to a post-marketing
confirmatory study of the drug’s long term effect on death, with
study results not required until 2022.23
Reliance on “real world data”
The EMA’s adaptive pathways proposal specifies that the
planned collection and analysis of “real world data”
(non-randomised observational studies) is essential for approval
through this route and that “repeat cycles of evidence
generation” can “quickly refine or correct past decisions.”20
However, the EMA’s pilot project provides no support for these
claims,8 and available scientific evidence tends to undermine
them. With respect to safety, proponents of adaptive pathways
claim that the availability of “big data” such as electronic health
records will enable “rapid learning” in the post-marketing
period.2 Yet past experience has shown that different
observational studies investigating the same safety issue may
produce conflicting results,24 and recent evaluations of
regulators’ and researchers’ experience of using large, electronic
health databases indicate mixed results with respect to signal
detection and signal confirmation.25-28 One review found that
large, publicly funded pilot studies in the EU and US have
largely failed to provide credible evidence of new, unsuspected
adverse effects or to yield reproducible results. The review
authors argue that considerable progress is needed in database
terminology and coding, data validation, and statistical methods
before electronic health records can be a reliable resource for
rapid assessment of drug safety.25 Such evaluations undermine
confidence that observational studies can quickly reduce
uncertainty. Pioglitazone for type II diabetes was approved by
the EMA in 2000, but early evidence from animal studies and
a subsequent trial in patients indicated that pioglitazone might
cause bladder cancer. Now, more than a dozen observational
studies have reached conflicting conclusions and failed to
definitively resolve this safety concern,29 and the drug (which
is now off patent) continues to be marketed in many European
countries.
The adaptive pathways paradigm also encourages the use of
“real world data” to support claims about drugs’ efficacy and
effectiveness, such as to confirm long term effects if initial
approval was based on early or surrogate endpoints. However,
reliance on observational data to evaluate drug efficacy is highly
problematic,30 and the bias is, on average, larger than the
estimated effect.31 There are many recent examples where
observational studies that suggested a treatment benefit were
overturned by RCTs. These include the protective effects of
hormone replacement therapy (HRT) and non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs against dementia32 33; HRT against
myocardial infarction34; and antioxidant vitamins against
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cardiovascular disease, cancer, and all cause mortality.35-39
Moreover, when results of observational studies “go the wrong
way” companies are likely to dispute unwelcome findings on
the very grounds that such data are unreliable.40
Although RCTs too may produce false and exaggerated
estimates of treatment benefit, RCTs are more likely to produce
true results than epidemiological studies.41Moreover, misleading
results from RCTs most often arise because of inappropriate
study design and conduct—a problem that more stringent
regulatory standards would reduce.4-42 Concerns relating to the
“generalisability” of RCTs43 could be tackled by adopting
pragmatic approaches to the design of studies, while preserving
the strengths of randomisation.44 45 Although rigorous
observational studies serve to generate hypotheses and may
complement RCTs that have robustly shown efficacy of a drug,
they cannot be relied on to compensate for weak evidence of
benefit or the uncertainties generated by adaptive pathways.46 47
Restricting or reversing use
Proponents of adaptive pathways assume that regulators, doctors,
and third party payers can, and will, restrict prescribing or
reverse use in response to emerging evidence of harms or lack
of benefit. But when new drugs are trumpeted as “breakthrough”
treatments it may be difficult to restrict use to a small patient
population or to subsequently withdraw a drug from themarket.48
Even among “regular” drugs many examples exist of off-label
and contraindicated use continuing in the face of repeated
warnings by regulatory bodies, and of monitoring requirements
failing to prevent the occurrence of deaths and serious harm to
patients.49 Studies of treatment practices that were subsequently
contradicted by large, well designed RCTs show that doctors
can be slow to abandon useless or unsafe practices.50 This is
partly because new data may emerge piecemeal and are often
disputed when financial rewards are high, conflicts abound, and
the reputations of individuals—and sometimes whole
specialties—are at stake.51
The EMA has claimed that recent experience with prospectively
designed risk management plans shows that restrictions on use
and regulatory warnings can be effective, and it cites two recent
examples, though these are based on relatively small surveys.20
“Life cycle management”
The adaptive pathways model assumes that regulators can be
trusted to implement “life cycle management” of new drugs and
to act promptly when subsequent evidence changes the
benefit-harm balance. Yet both the US Food and Drug
Administration and the EMA have been criticised for neglecting
to monitor or enforce post-marketing study commitments for
conditionally approved drugs.3 52 The EMA claims that the
situation in the EU has changed since implementation of the
EU pharmacovigilance legislation in 2012.20 A report on the
activities of the EMA’s new Pharmacovigilance Risk
Assessment Committee does suggest that the EMA is taking a
more proactive approach to pharmacovigilance and risk
management, and it is to be commended for this.53 However,
the report’s authors looked at the effect of specific practices on
process measures rather than on patient safety, so it seems
premature to draw strong conclusions about the success of the
legislation.
Moreover, when regulators have failed to act on post-marketing
evidence that drugs are ineffective or can no longer be safely
used this is usually not because they lack the tools to act but
reflects, rather, a culture in which regulators seem to have a
high tolerance for drug harms, even when drug benefits are
marginal or non-existent.54-56
Public risk, private reward?
The EMA claims that early access to drugs will benefit patients
and that adaptive pathways will not change regulatory standards
or the requirement to show a positive benefit-harm balance to
obtain marketing authorisation.7However, accelerated approval
and conditional marketing have already lowered the regulatory
bar. And when evidence comes from uncontrolled studies of
poorly predictive surrogate endpoints in a small number of
patients, the EMA’s determination that benefits outweigh harms
“may be no more than a guess.”3 Whether guesswork is an
acceptable basis for approving new drugs is a question of
fundamental importance to citizens and public health.Moreover,
when potentially unsafe, ineffective, or marginally effective
drugs are prescribed and reimbursed under the mistaken belief
that they are of great clinical utility, the costs to patients and
the public are high—in terms of the opportunity costs of wasted
healthcare resources and the costs to patients who have been
exposed to futile or dangerous treatments.
We would argue that neither a scientific nor an ethical case for
adaptive pathways has been made. Whether—and, if so,
when—the benefits to some patients of early approval might
outweigh the risks to more patients in the future and to public
health needs urgent discussion. This discussion must consider
the lessons over more than 20 years of expedited drug
development and review in the US and the EU and known
examples of regulators failing to protect public health.57
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